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TRUST and Retaliation: The First
Amendment and Trump’s Taxes
TIMOTHY ZICK John Marshall Professor of Government and Citizenship, William &
Mary Law School

In the latest salvo in his longstanding bid to avoid disclosing his tax returns, President Trump
has sued the House Ways and Means Committee, the New York Attorney General, and the New
York tax commissioner. The federal suit, filed in Trump’s capacity as an individual citizen, argues
that a recently enacted New York law, the TRUST Act, which authorizes the disclosure of state
returns filed by certain federal officials to the House Ways and Means Committee, violates the First
Amendment because it punishes Trump for his party affiliation and policies. It also claims that the
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Ways and Means Committee has no lawful purpose for receiving individual state tax returns and has
relied instead on pretextual rationales. The suit relies heavily on allegations of pretextual purpose or
motive. It alleges state legislators and the Ways and Means chair have conspired to retaliate against
and punish Trump because he is a Republican and supports policies they dislike. However, in
pursuing that claim, the president has a motive problem.

Trump and Unlawful Purpose
During his first two years, the president has had a virtual crash course on litigation focused on
actual purpose and unlawful motives. His Muslim ban survived a legal challenge based in part on
Trump’s expressions of bigotry against Muslims. However, Wilbur Ross, his Commerce Secretary,
got crossways with the Supreme Court when the justices concluded Ross’s reasons for asking about
citizenship in connection with the census were pretextual.
Trump is asking a federal court to invalidate the TRUST Act primarily on the ground that officials
enacted the law for illicit retaliatory reasons. The complaint cites statements by legislators (and
some anonymous sources cited by mainstream media) to support the claim that the law was passed
as payback or punishment for Trump’s political affiliation and policy positions. In brief, he is
invoking a motive or purpose argument similar to the one plaintiffs relied on in litigation against the
administration.

The Law of Purpose
Questions of governmental motive have dominated some recent high-profile Supreme Court cases.
In addition to the Muslim ban case, the Supreme Court has considered purpose or motive questions
in cases involving alleged anti-religious animus in connection with refusals to make wedding cakes
for same-sex couples and the display of a large Latin cross in Bladensburg, Maryland. Determining
actual governmental purpose or motive is generally a difficult task. In most cases that is because,
unlike President Trump, lawmakers and executive officials do not typically display their biases in
tweets and other public statements. In many cases, courts have the difficult task of determining what
actually produced the legislation or executive action under challenge.
The Supreme Court has not charted a clear path with regard to issues or pretext and motive. Indeed,
its recent forays in this area are uneven. The Muslim ban survived despite very clear evidence of
presidential bigotry. That likely had a lot to do with the deference courts show to executives in the
realm of immigration rather than any real assessment of presidential purpose or motive. The
Supreme Court actually admonished the president for his statements, effectively telling him that
presidents can and have done better, but went on to credit his national security explanation all the
same. In the wedding cake case, by contrast, the Court scoured the record for evidence of antireligious bigotry. It found a couple of statements by officials that, when arguably taken out of
context, could be characterized as evidence of bias. Concluding that the statements demonstrated
animus against the baker owing to his religion, the Court invalidated a state agency order that the
baker provide a wedding cake to the same-sex couple.
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Proving Retaliation
What, then, should we make of the president’s claims of retaliatory motive or purpose? In his
lawsuit, the president relies on what he claims is the TRUST Act’s “unlawful purpose” to punish
him for his political affiliation and policies. As evidence of retaliatory purpose, the president points
primarily to public statements by the Act’s sponsors and supporters. However, many of those
statements expressed the idea that “no one is above the law.” Sponsors of the TRUST Act and other
officials also referred to the president’s refusal to provide any information about his taxes as an
occasion to insist on some official transparency in this area. In other words, the statements invoked
Trump, but only as an example or impetus for tax return transparency.
As Trump’s lawyers are likely aware, courts do not generally look beyond the face of a law to
determine whether it has a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose. That does not mean they will – or
should – ignore the sort of explicit animus or bigotry Trump expressed in defending his Muslim
ban. Moreover, where evidence of pretext is apparent in the record, courts are not shy about calling
it out – as, again, Secretary Ross recently discovered. Trump’s complaint urges the court to adopt a
broad motive inquiry when it comes to legislative purpose. That approach does not have a lot of
support on the Court. In fact, in a case cited in the complaint, which focused on free exercise of
religion, only two justices agreed that legislative statements were relevant.
As the Supreme Court said in United States v. O’Brien, which rejected a First Amendment challenge
to a federal law banning destruction of draft cards during the Vietnam War, “It is a familiar principle
of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” Like Trump, O’Brien relied on statements by various
legislators who were opposed to the viewpoints of draft opponents and the optics of draft card
burning during the war. The Supreme Court concluded that the law, which on its face regulated the
act of destroying government records and not speech, did not violate the First Amendment. Other
decisions have also expressed heavy skepticism that courts can derive a single purpose or motive
from the statements of members in large and diverse legislative bodies.
The TRUST Act itself does not single out the president or his state returns. It applies to the vice
president and other federal officials as well. The Act does not explicitly regulate political affiliation
of political speech. Since the Act has not yet been invoked or enforced Trump cannot claim officials
have used it to target either Republicans or Democrats. None of the statements cited in the
complaint target Trump’s party affiliation or specific policies. Indeed, it is the complaint that points
to political affiliation. It suggests that since the defendants are all Democrats, he had established
discriminatory purpose. That argument would lead to the absurd conclusion that any law enacted by
members of a body dominated by one political party violates the First Amendment if enforced
against a speaker belonging to a different party. Evidence of retaliatory purpose in First Amendment
cases requires a much more specific showing – for example, that the government has fired someone,
or taken some other action against them, because of their political associations or speech.
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It is true, as alleged in the complaint, that New York’s legislature passed the TRUST Act in the
wake of the administration’s refusal to comply with the House committee’s subpoena for Trump’s
tax returns. It is also true that some, perhaps even more than a few, federal and state legislators
dislike Donald Trump and may wish to embarrass him through release of his tax returns. However,
as noted, the timing of the law and its political climate are not likely enough to establish that the
actual purpose of the state law was and is to retaliate against Trump for his speech and associational
activities. To give an example, very few jurisdictions had laws on the books regulating or banning
protests near the funerals of U.S. veterans killed in action prior to the time members of the Westboro
Baptist Church started organizing such protests. Yet the fact that today nearly all jurisdictions have
some type of law or regulation concerning this practice does not mean they all violate the First
Amendment. So long as the laws are neutral on their face, courts will not generally delve into the
legislative motive for enacting them.
In the case of Trump’s tax returns, speculation has been rampant about what the documents might
reveal. There are valid transparency, emoluments, and other law and order concerns at stake,
particularly as they relate to a president with questionable business dealings – including some
reportedly involving Russian officials. Even if the purpose of the TRUST Act is to aid the House
Ways and Means Committee in obtaining Trump’s returns, that alone does not establish the state law
was a form of payback for Trump’s party affiliation or political expression.
As indicated, the Supreme Court has not always been consistent with regard to motive or purpose
inquiries. Despite its strong statements in cases like O’Brien, in another line of cases it has held that
if a challenger can muster some evidence of discriminatory enforcement or enactment, then courts
may inquire whether the legislature would have enacted or enforced the law anyway, for legitimate
reasons. Even under that approach, assuming there is evidence of retaliatory purpose, New York’s
legislature could readily point to the above concerns as grounds for answering that question in the
affirmative.
If the point of the lawsuit is to show that New York legislators and executive officials do not like the
president, the complaint seems hardly necessary. If that were sufficient to prove illicit purpose and
invalidate any state or federal law, the president’s lawyers and the courts might quickly be
overwhelmed. The president’s attempt to turn the tables by accusing the defendants of unlawful
animus is likely to fail.
EXECUTIVE POWER, FIRST AMENDMENT, FREE SPEECH, SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND FEDERALISM, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
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